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\-on Neumann in [9] introduced two-person games with rational payoff 
functions and extended the minimax theorem. Since then, other very efficient 
and elegant approaches to prove it in the estended case have been considered 
(for example, Bellman [l]). Loomis in [4] and Shapley in [8] also considered 
such games. In this paper, we prove the existence of an equilibrium point in 
an n-person game with rational payoff functions. 
Consider the following auxiliary result: 
LEMMA. Let 27 be a nonempty, compact, and convex set in a Euclidean space 
and let + be a real continuous function defined on Z x Z. If  for each 7 E Z, 
$(., 7) is quasi-concave, then there exists a 5 e 2 such that 
Proof. For a given 7 E Z:, consider the set 
Q(T) = {u E 2 C(u, T) = Ill&X&, T); 
which is nonempty since 4 is continuous. Moreover, by the quasi-concavity 
of $(-, 0, O(t) is convex. This determines a multivalued function 8: Z -+ Z. 
\\:e will show that 6 is upper-semicontinuous. Indeed, consider any two 
convergent sequences l(n) - < and c(n) - o of points of 2, such that 
u(n) IG 0({(n)) for each n. Therefore, we have the following 
and 
d(+), 5(n)) - +(a, i) 
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since both functions are continuous. On the other hand, the condition 
u(n) E e([(n)) for each n, implies that both previous limits coincide. Hence, 
u E e(t), which in other words, says that the function ~9 is upper-semi- 
continuous. 
Using Kakutani’s fixed point theorem, we obtain the existence of a point 
5 E 19(6). Such a point satisfies the condition of the lemma. Q.E.D. 
Now consider an n-person game r = {& , Fi; i E N} where the strategy 
sets Zi are compact and convex in Euclidean spaces. The payoff functions 
Fi = MJN, are continuous rational functions where Mi and Ni are concave 
and convex in (TV E Zi for each ~~--(~j E ZN-cil = XjsN-(il Zj, respectively. 
Besides, Ni is positive. 
THEOREM. r has un equilibrium point. 
Proof. For each player i E N, consider the function 
with r E Z = XjsNZj . This function is concave in cri E .Zi for each 7 E .Z 
since it is the sum of two concave functions. 
is concave in u E Z, too. By the previous lemma there is a 6 E Z, such that 
d@, 6) = y&=$(u, 6) 
or equivalently 
Gi(Oi , 5) 3 G,(q ,a) 
for each i E N and ui E Zi . Substituting the hi’s and N’s, we have 
Therefore, a is an equilibrium point of r. Q.E.D. 
At this point, we remark the fact that the previous theorem cannot imme- 
diately be extended to the case when Mi is quasi-concave and Ni is convex. 
The reason is that the sum of a quasi-concave and a concave functions is not 
necessarily quasi-concave. Indeed, consider, as an example, the functions 
defined in [0, 21: 
RATIONAL 11-PERSON GAMES 
f(x) = f s + (1 - $) if .T E [I - E, I], 
l X+(1 +f, .= - - if SE[l, 1 + c], 
E 
-0 if s E [O, 1 - E] u [I -c 6, 21, 
g(x) = x, s E [O, 21 
for some 0 < E < 1. It is easy to see that f  + g is not quasi-concave. 
As a direct application of the Theorem, we have the following result: 
COROLLARY I. The extension r* = {L?‘i , Hi; i E Xl. of any finite game 
r = [.Zi, --li/Bi, i E N} with 
si E J?‘i and where Ei and Fi are the expectations qf Ai and Bi , respectively, has 
an equilibrium point when Bi > 0. 
If  Bj is identically one, then an equilibrium point of r* becomes an 
equilibrium point for the mixed extension F = {f; , Ej; i E IV). On the 
other hand, in the case of zero-sum two-person games we have ron Neumann’s 
theorem. 
As a further application of the main results, we have: 
COROLLARY 2. For any game r = {Zj , F,; i E ;Vj zcith compact and convex 
strategy sets Zi in en&dean spaces and a!here the pa&voJ functions Fj = M,,/N, 
are rational functions ecith Al, and Ni > 0 concave and conrex in ui E C, . 
respectively, there exists a point 6 E Z such that -for each i E S and each 0) E .Z:, 
zcith 
and 
e(i) = N - (f(i) U {ii), f(i) C A- - (iI 1 
Proof. The minimum of concave functions is concave and the maximum 
of convex functions is convex. Therefore, the theorem applied to the new 
game with maximum and minimum in the payoff functions. gives the desired 
result immediately. Q.E.D. 
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We note that by using the Fan-Glicksberg generalization of Kakutani’s 
fixed-point theorem, given in [2, 31, the technique allows us to have the 
existence of an equilibrium point for rational games defined on suitable 
linear topological spaces, and therefore, for the mixed extension of continuous 
games can be obtained in a similar manner. 
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